We show that the value of a zero-sum Bayesian game is a Lipschitz continuous function of the players'common prior belief, with respect to the total variation metric (that induces the topology of setwise convergence on beliefs). This is unlike the case of general Bayesian games, where lower semi-continuity of Bayesian equilibrium payo¤s rests on the convergence of conditional beliefs (Engl (1994), Kajii and Morris (1998) ). We also show upper, and approximate lower, semicontinuity of the optimal strategy correspondence with respect to the total variation norm, and discuss approximate lower semi-continuity of the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence in the context of zero-sum games.
Introduction
Bayesian games describe situations where there is uncertainty about players' payo¤s, and players may have di¤erent private information about the realized state of nature that a¤ects the payo¤s. Being a natural framework for modelling numerous real world issues, it has been a subject of extensive investigation in the literature. In particular, the question of continuity of Bayesian equilibria (BE) with respect to changes in players'information endowments received some attention.
One strand of research concentrated on the continuity of BE with respect to changes in information partitions, or …elds (see, e.g., Monderer and Samet (1996) , Einy et al (2008) ). Another strand considered the e¤ects of small changes in the players' common prior belief (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1985) , Engl (1995) , and Morris (1994, 1998) ). Milgrom and Weber (1985) showed upper semi-continuity (USC) of the BE correspondence under a very general condition, that requires that the common prior be su¢ ciently "spread-out" on the product of players'types. This condition is satis…ed trivially in the important case where each player has at most countably many types, which is equivalent to assuming that his private information is given by a countable partition of the space of states of nature. In this latter framework, Engl (1995) investigated (approximate) lower semicontinuity ((A)LSC) of the BE expected payo¤ correspondence, under the uniform setwise convergence topology on priors.
The ALSC means that for any BE in a game and any " > 0, there is an "-equilibrium with close expected payo¤s in the same game, for any close enough common prior. 1 Engl (1995) showed that the BE expected payo¤ correspondence is ALSC, assuming that the approximating "-BE are with respect to ex-ante expected utilities. However, if players evaluate the consequences of their strategic choices at the interim stage, following the receipt of private information, they are in fact concerned with their interim expected utility, that takes into account their private information and is based on the correspondingly updated prior belief. But while ex-ante and interim BE are the same, this is not true for the approximate, "-BE, since an exante "-best response may be hugely suboptimal for some realizations of the player's private information, albeit with small probability. Morris (1994, 1998) showed that, if the approximate "-BE are taken in the interim sense, ALSC of the BE expected payo¤ and strategy correspondences may fail if priors are converging only setwise. They showed that to obtain ALSC of the interim BE expected payo¤ correspondence, uniform across bounded games, it is necessary (and su¢ cient) to additionally assume almost uniform convergence of beliefs conditional on players'private information (i.e., that the closeness of conditional beliefs becomes approximate common knowledge with high ex-ante probability).
In this work we consider zero-sum Bayesian games. These games recently came into spotlight, particularly in the context of comparing information structures and measuring the value of information (see, e.g., Gossner and Mertens (2001) , Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) ). We start by showing that the value of a zero-sum game is a Lipschitz continuous function of players' common prior belief, with respect to the total variation metric on the set of priors; see Theorem 1. (This metric induces the setwise convergence topology on priors.)
Although being in line with Engl's (1994) result on the ALSC of the ex-ante BE expected payo¤ correspondence, Theorem 1 implies a previously unnoticed fact. Since pairs of optimal strategies are both interim and ex-ante BE in a zero-sum Bayesian game, and the value ( the expected BE payo¤) is a continuous function of the common prior, the interim BE expected payo¤ correspondence is in fact LSC (and in particular ALSC) when restricted to zero-sum games. Thus, the assumptions of Kajii and Morris (1998) on the convergence of conditional beliefs, which are necessary for ALSC in the nonzero-sum setting, are not needed in the context of zero-sum Bayesian games.
Theorem 1 bears semblance to another uniform continuity result for the value of zero-sum games, in Einy et al (2008) , which was established in a di¤erent setting: the common prior of the players was …xed, but their information …elds were variable, and the set of …elds was endowed with the Boylan pseudo-metric. This result does not imply Theorem 1, however, as the latter deals with variable common priors.
We further show that the optimal strategy correspondence is both USC (Proposition 1) and ALSC (Proposition 2) with respect to the total variation metric on priors. Since optimal strategies are both ex-ante and interim BE strategies in zero-sum Bayesian games, Proposition 1 implies that the ex-ante and the interim BE correspondences are USC. However, the notion of ALSC uses "-optimal strategies to approximate the given optimal strategy, and "-optimal strategies are de…ned with respect to the ex-ante expected payo¤s in the game. Thus Proposition 2 implies that the ex-ante BE correspondence is ALSC in zero-sum Bayesian games, but it sheds no light on the ALSC of the interim BE correspondence in these games.
As was mentioned, the interim BE correspondence may not be ALSC with respect to the total variation metric on priors, in cases where conditional beliefs do not converge almost uniformly (see Kajii and Morris (1994) ). Our last two results show that in some circumstances the interim BE correspondence is ALSC in zero-sum Bayesian games without any assumptions on the convergence of conditional beliefs. Proposition 3 identi…es one such instance in games where each player has an in…nite information partition; the main assumption is that knowledge of player's own type allows him to guess the type of the other player while making a bounded error. When at least one of the players has a …nite information partition, ALSC of the interim BE correspondence obtains without this asssumption, see Proposition 4.
The paper is organized as follows. The setup is described in section 2 and our results are stated and proved in section 3.
Preliminaries

Zero-Sum Bayesian Games
We consider zero-sum games with two players, i = 1; 2: Games are played in an uncertain environment, which a¤ects payo¤ functions of the players. The underlying uncertainty is described by a probability space ( ; F; ) ; where is a set of states of nature, F is a -…eld of events in ; and is a countably additive probability measure on ( ; F) that represents the common prior belief of the players about the distribution of the realized state of nature: The information endowment of player i is given by an (at most) countable and F-measurable partition i of : Given ! 2 ; denote by i (!) the element of the partition i that contains !: If ! was realized, player i only knows that the realized state of nature belongs to i (!) : Each player i = 1; 2 has a set S i of strategies, which is a convex and The probability space ( ; F; ) ; information endowments 1 and 2 ; strategy sets S 1 and S 2 ; and the payo¤ function u fully describe a zero-sum Bayesian game. To concentrate on the e¤ects of changes in the common prior, we keep all the attributes of the game …xed henceforth, with the exception of 2 ( ; F) the set of all countably additive probability measures on ( ; F). For any 2 ( ; F) ; the associated zero-sum Bayesian game will be denoted by G( ):
A Bayesian strategy of player i is a i -measurable function
The set of all Bayesian strategies of player i will be denoted by X i : Clearly; X i can be identi…ed with the function
; which is convex and compact in the product topology, and also metrizable in it since i is at most countable. Given 2 ( ; F) ; the expected payo¤ of player 1 (and the expected loss of player 2) when x i 2 X i is chosen by i = 1; 2 is
Remark 1. In order for the expected payo¤ function U to be well de…ned for a given 2 ( ; F) ; -integrability of an F-measurable
All our results, with the exception of Proposition 3, use only the fact that S i is a compact and metrizable subset of a topological vector space. For Proposition 3, the assumption of S i being a Banach space, not necessarily of …nite dimension, would have su¢ ced. We, however, con…ne ourselves to the …nite-dimension framework, so as to avoid unnecessary generality. 3 The measurability is with respect to the -…eld F in the …rst coordinate, and with respect to the Borel -…elds in the second and third coordinates.
would have su¢ ced, without the need to assume uniform boundedness of u as we did earlier. However, since our interest lies in changing common priors in the game with a …xed utility function, f needs to be integrable with respect to all 2 ( ; F) : This, in fact, implies the existence of
With our assumptions on u; the expected payo¤ function U is continuous and concave in x 1 2 X 1 for a …xed x 2 2 X 2 ; and continuous and convex in x 2 2 X 2 for a …xed x 1 2 X 1 (the continuity is implied by the bounded convergence theorem). Thus, Sion minimax theorem (see, e.g., Theorem A.7 in Sorin (2002)) guarantees existence of the value v( ) in each game G( ): the following inequality holds,
and v( ) is de…ned as the common value of the two expressions in (1).
for any x 1 2 X 1 : If a strategy x i is 0-optimal for player i, it is called optimal for i. The set of "-optimal strategies of player i in G( ) will be denoted by O i " ( ) : It is convex and compact. The notation for O i 0 ( ) ; the set of optimal strategies, will be simpli…ed to O i ( ). Optimality of a strategy is closely related to the concept of equilibrium.
for any x 1 2 X 1 ; and
for any x 2 2 X 2 : Denote by EBE " ( ) the set of all "-EBE in G( ); and
we will call it an ex-ante Bayesian equilibrium (EBE for short).
Remark 2. Note that, for every " 0;
and the value v( ) is the unique EBE payo¤ (to player 1) in the game G( ).
Example 1 (Matrix Bayesian Game). Assume that each player i has n i pure strategies, and S i is the (n i 1)-dimensional simplex of i's mixed strategies. Assume further that in each ! 2 ; the payo¤ function is given by u !;
where strategy s 1 2 S 1 is regarded as a row vector, s 2 2 S 2 -as a column vector, and A(!) is an n 1 n 2 -matrix, with A(!) j;k being the payo¤ of player 1 when he chooses pure strategy j and 2 -pure strategy k, which is uniformly bounded across : Then the strategy sets of players and the payo¤ function satisfy all the conditions listed above, and the associated zero-sum Bayesian game is amenable to our analysis.
Interim Expected Payo¤s
The notions of the value of a game, and of the optimality of strategies, are de…ned with respect to players' ex-ante expected payo¤s. In other words, players are assumed to evaluate their utilities before any private information is revealed. However, they may conceivably want to evaluate the consequences of their strategic choices at the interim stage, following the receipt of private information. In other words, players may be concerned with their interim expected payo¤, that takes into account their private information and is based on the appropriately updated prior belief.
To formalize the discussion, let 2 ( ; F) : For any ! 2 and i = 1; 2; denote by i (!) the element of partition i that contains !: If ( i (!)) > 0; denote by i (!) 2 ( ; F) the conditional belief of player i; given his information at !; i.e., for any A 2 F;
The function U i (!) ( ; ) will be referred to as the interim expected payo¤
for every x 1 2 X 1 and every ! 2 with ( 1 (!)) > 0; and
for every x 2 2 X 2 and every ! 2 with (
we will call it an interim Bayesian equilibrium (IBE for short).
Remark 3. When " = 0; there is no distinction between IBE and EBE. De…nitions embodied in (2), (3) and (6), (7) are equivalent, as are indeed the notions of IBE and EBE in general, non-zero-sum, games. Accordingly, neither the value of a zero-sum Bayesian game (viewed as the ex-ante payo¤ in an IBE) nor the optimal strategies (viewed as IBE strategies) need not be rede…ned in the interim expected payo¤s setting.
Remark 4. When " > 0; the de…nition of "-IBE is signi…cantly more demanding than that of "-EBE. Although any "-IBE is in particular an "-EBE, i.e., IBE " ( ) EBE " ( ) ; as follows from integrating both sides in (6) and (7) over , the opposite is not true. In terms of the interim expected payo¤s U i (!) ( ; ), the de…nition of (b
for every x 2 2 X 2 and every ! 2 with ( 2 (!)) > 0: This indicates that although an "-EBE strategy b x i is ex-ante an "-best response against b x j , it may be hugely interim-suboptimal in states of nature ! with low probability ( i (!)), thereby failing to be an " 0 -IBE strategy for all su¢ ciently small " 0 : (See, e.g., Example 2 in section 3.3.)
Topology on Common Priors
Consider the total variation metric d on ( ; F) ; given by
where the supremum is taken over all F-measurable functions f : ! [ 1; 1] (see, e.g., Lemma 1 on p. 360 in Shiryaev (1996) ). Given any (
2 , note that, by the boundedness of u and (11),
3 Results
Continuity of Value
Our main result establishes Lipschitz continuity of the value:
Proof
This holds for every x 2 2 X 2 , and hence it follows that v( 0 ) = max
Similarly, starting withx 2 2 O 2 ( ) we obtain
The combination of (13) and (14) yields (12) .
Theorem 1 implies, in particular, that the single-valued EBE (or, equivalently via Remark 3, IBE) expected payo¤ correspondence is both lower and upper semi-continuous with respect to the total variation metric on the common prior, when restricted to zero-sum Bayesian games. This stands in contrast to the general, non-zero-sum case. As was shown by Kajii and Morris (1998), IBE payo¤s in a non-zero-sum Bayesian game G( ) may be quite far from "-IBE payo¤s in G( 0 ) for all small enough " > 0; even if d( ; 0 ) is arbitrarily small, when the beliefs conditional on each player's private information do not converge uniformly. But, in the zero-sum case, the IBE payo¤ in G( ) is approximated by the true IBE payo¤ in G( 0 ) (not merely an "-IBE payo¤) when d( ; 0 ) ! 0:
Upper Semi-continuity of Optimal Strategies
In addition to the value of a zero-sum Bayesian game, optimal strategies also have strong continuity properties with respect to the total variation metric on the common prior. Given a sequence f n g 1 n=0
( ; F) such that lim n!1 n = 0 ; we say that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semi-continuous (USC) along f n g 1 n=1 if the following holds: for any player i and any sequence fx 
Proposition 1.
The optimal strategy correspondence is USC along any convergent sequence f n g 1 n=1 ( ; F).
We will assume i = 1, the case of i = 2 being analogous. Take any x 2 2 X 2 : By assumption, for any n 1
Using Lemma 1, we obtain
and thus lim n!1
by continuity of U 0 in the …rst variable. Now, taking the limits of both sides in (15) and using Theorem 1 yields
Since this holds for every
; as was mentioned in Remark 2, Proposition 1 also establishes that the EBE correspondence (and, equivalently by Remark 3, the IBE correspondence) is USC in zero-sum Bayesian games.
Approximate Lower Semi-continuity of Optimal Strategies, EBE, and IBE
De…ning lower semi-continuity of the optimal strategy correspondence requires some care. Its straightforward version will not work: given f n g 
X
i such that lim n!1x i n =x i 0 andx i n is optimal in G ( n ) for each n 1: Indeed, even in a simple decision problem (i.e., a oneplayer game) not all payo¤ maximizers may be approximable by maximizers in nearby problems. Thus, the appropriate notion of lower semi-continuity of the optimal strategy correspondence with respect to the common prior is the following. We will say that the optimal strategy correspondence is approximately lower semi-continuous (ALSC) along a sequence f n g 
i with lim n!1x i n =x i 0 ; such thatx i n is (merely) "-optimal in G ( n ) for every n 1: Similarly, the EBE (respectively, IBE) correspondence is de…ned to be ALSC along a sequence f n g 1 n=1 with lim n!1 n = 0 by the requirement that, given any (x 1 ;x 2 ) 2 EBE ( 0 ) (respectively, IBE ( 0 )) and any " > 0; there exists a sequence f(x
It follows from the next proposition that the optimal strategy correspondence is ALSC, with the sequence fx 
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we will only consider the case of i = 1. Fix any 2 ( ; F) and letx 1 2 O 1 ( ). By Lemma 1, optimality ofx 1 , and Theorem 1, for any x 2 2 X 2 and any 0 2 ( ; F),
According to Proposition 2, if lim n!1 n = 0 then, for a given " > 0; anŷ x i 0 which is optimal in G ( 0 ) is also "-optimal in G( n ) for all su¢ ciently large n: However, while optimality of a strategy has an interpretation in terms of both ex-ante and interim expected payo¤s (since O 1 ( ) O 2 ( ) = EBE ( ) = IBE ( ), by Remarks 2 and 3), this is no longer so with "-optimality which is a purely ex-ante concept (as expounded in Remark 4). Thus, although Proposition 2 trivially implies that the EBE correspondence is ALSC along any converging sequence f n g
( n ) by Remark 2), it remains mute on IBE. And indeed, a pair (
may fail to be in IBE " ( n ) for all n 1 and all small enough " :
ff2n; 2n 1g : n 2 Ng ; and, …nally,
is ! is even. :
If 0 is a probability measure with the full support on f2n : n 2 Ng ; then, clearly,x 1 0 ( ) 1 is an optimal strategy of player 1 in G( 0 ): Consider, however, a sequence f n g 1 n=1 of probability measure, such that, for every n, n is identical to 0 on all subsets of n f2n; 2n 1g ; but n (f2ng) = n (f2n 1g) = 1 2 0 (f2ng) : Then clearly lim n!1 n = 0 ; but (x 1 0 ; 0) = 2 IBE " ( n ) for every n 1 and all " 2 [0; 1 2 ):
However, the failure of some (x 1 0 ;x 2 0 ) 2 IBE ( 0 ) to be in IBE " ( n ) for all small enough " > 0; does not rule out that the IBE correspondence is ALSC: it does not preclude the possibility that ( It is well known that the IBE correspondence in non-zero-sum Bayesian games is not ALSC with respect to the total variation metric on ( ; F) : It is shown in Kajii and Morris (1994) (Example 1, Section 4.2 there) that an IBE in a non-zero-sum Bayesian game G( ) may be far from all "-IBE in G( n ); for all su¢ ciently low values of ", and in all states of nature. What is at fault in that example is a non-uniform (across ) convergence of prior beliefs conditional on players'private information (i.e., of measures ( n ) i (!) i=1;2;!2 ), which may occur despite that lim n!1 n = 0 in the total variation metric (see also Example 2 above). More precisely, the problem lies in the lack of almost uniform convergence of conditional beliefs, which is de…ned, roughly speaking, by the requirement that the closeness of conditional beliefs becomes approximate common knowledge with high ex-ante probability. 4 Our next Proposition 3 indicates that the (almost) uniform convergence of conditional beliefs may not be necessary for the IBE correspondence being ALSC in zero-sum Bayesian games. The proposition makes certain assumptions on the support of f n g any additional requirement on the convergence of conditional beliefs. 5 Before we state Proposition 3, the following convention is in order. For each i = 1; 2; we will write the elements of the (at most countable) partition i as an indexed sequence ( ; F) be such that lim n!1 n = 0 ; and assume that in zero-sum Bayesian games fG ( n )g 1 n=0 :
(I) there exists C > 0 such that, for every ! 2 ; the payo¤ function u (!; ; ) is Lipschitz continuous with a constant C with respect to the Euclidean norm on S (II) T 1 = T 2 = 1; and there exist functions t 1 ; t 2 : N ! N with lim n!1 min(t 1 ; t 2 ) (n) = 1; and an integer K > 0 such that, for every i = 1; 2 and every j 1 : Note that assumption (I) is implied by the uniform boundedness of u if fG( n )g (IIb) means that although player i may be unsure of the type of his rival; he can estimate it via the function t i and in doing so make an error of at most K (given the knowledge of his own type). This assumption is satis…ed, for instance, by the information structure in the electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1994) . 
where k k denotes the Euclidean norm on both S 1 and S 2 : De…ne a sequence x 
Let J ( ) 1 + 1 be such for all j J ( ) and i = 1; 2; t i (j) 1 + 1: Since lim n!1 n = 0 ; it follows from assumption (IIa) on 0 that there exists N > 0 such that
By Proposition 2, the assumption that lim n!1 n = 0 , and the fact that 
2 IBE " ( n ) for each n N ( ) : We will only show that
for every x 1 2 X 1 , every j 1; and every n N ( ) : It could then be established similarly that
for every x 2 2 X 2 ; every j 1; and every n N ( ) ; and thus (6) and (7) in the de…nition of "-IBE will follow. 
and 
(by the de…nition of x 1 n; and x 1 n; )
(by assumption (I) and the de…nition of x 2 n; and x 2 n; )
Similarly, it can be shown that
Thus,
By the choice of N ( ), x i n; 2 O i " 0 ( n ) for i = 1; 2 and every n N ( ) ; being a convex combination of " 0 -optimal strategies. Therefore, by (8) in Remark 4, for every n N ( )
From (23) and (24), for every n N ( )
by the de…nition of " 0 and the choice of (see (16), (18)). We conclude that (19) and (20) hold, and thus indeed x 1 n; ; x 2 n;
is a strictly increasing sequence of positive integers (recall the de…nition of 0 in (16)). Consider a
) for k = 1; 2; :::; and (x 
by (8) 
By our assumptions on f n g 
for every 1 j T 1 , every x 1 2 X 1 ; and every n N 1 ( ) : Just as in (28), for every 1 j J ( ) with n 2 j > 0 and
By our assumptions on f n g for every J ( ) j < min(T 2 + 1; 1); every x 2 2 X 2 and every n N 2 ( ) : Thus, (32) in fact holds for every 1 j < min(T 2 + 1; 1); every x 2 2 X 2 ; and every n N 2 ( ) : This fact, coupled with (30), shows that (x 
